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ABSTRACT 
The anticipated advent of the U.S. Government 
sponsoring human-tended research on commercial 
suborbital flights necessitates the establishment of 
safety review procedures for federal agencies to allow 
government-sponsored spaceflight participants (SFPs) 
aboard these vehicles.  Safety practices for National 
Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA) personnel 
aboard aircraft, orbital rockets and platforms, and a non-
NASA vehicle, the Soyuz, are summarized.  The 
valuable “Recommended Practices for Human Space 
Flight Occupant Safety,” published by the FAA Office 
of Commercial Space Transportation (FAA-AST) in 
2014, are summarized.  Medical recommendations for 
operationally critical flight crewmembers, published by 
the Aerospace Medical Association Commercial 
Spaceflight Working Group, are reviewed.  FAA-AST-
approved SFP training available at three U.S. 
commercial companies is summarized.  Activities of 
ASTM International Committee F47 on Commercial 
Spaceflight, formed in 2016, are reviewed.  Finally, 
safety comparisons are made with another challenging 
environment, deep sea submersibles. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
At the urging of industry advocates, the U.S. Congress 
is encouraging the emergence of commercial space 
capabilities by limiting government regulatory 
requirements for developers/providers [Commercial 
Space Launch Act (1984), extended by Commercial 
Space Launch Amendments Act (Public Law 108–492, 
Dec. 23, 2004)].  Like other commercial spaceflight 
providers, commercial suborbital Reusable Launch 
Vehicle (sRLV) providers are licensed under FAA-AST 
regulations to provide safety to the uninvolved public 
under a designated “learning period.”  In essence, 
commercial space providers are operating in a safety 
pre-certification era.  As a commercial licensed activity, 
a sRLV provider can sell flights to the public for 
participation at their own risk.  Identified as spaceflight 
participants (SFPs), they are informed that the vehicle 
has not been independently certified as safe by the FAA.  
They are informed of specific risks to potential personal 
harm and/or loss of life and must sign a waiver of 
liability based on informed consent.  It is worth noting 
that FAA-AST has developed and published 
recommended practices for human spaceflight occupant 
safety and training, discussed later, to serve as 
guidelines for developers during this learning period.  
These recommended practices are intended to be 
translated into a regulatory safety certification regime 
after the learning period expires. 
 
2. FAA AND NASA FLIGHT PARTICIPANT 
SAFETY PRACTICES 
For commercial and private aviation, the FAA has 
established and modified rules over decades to ensure 
passenger safety.  These rules incorporate proven 
maintenance standards and practices based on practical 
experiences and rigorous aircrew training standards and 
requirements.  In contrast, NASA’s aviation safety 
authority self-regulates NASA-sponsored personnel 
aboard public-use and non-NASA-controlled aircraft.  
The cognizant NASA Center Technical Authority 
oversees an independent safety review of the proposed 
aviation flight activity.  Approval for a given flight or 
series of flights is granted after a comprehensive 
program review to determine if mission and safety risks 
have been identified and mitigated to acceptable levels.  
The scope of the review is based on the complexity and 
criticality of the aviation flight activity. 
 
For U.S. astronauts, a NASA Procedural Requirements 
Document (NPR) establishes procedural and technical 
requirements for human-rating certification.  Exceptions 
are the International Space Station (ISS) and Soyuz (and 
in an earlier revision, the Space Shuttle), which are not 
required to obtain a human-rating certification.  Those 
latter programs “utilize existing policies, procedures, 
and requirements to certify their systems for NASA 
missions” [1]. 
 
The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness 
Act of 2015 (H.R. 2262) created new category of NASA 
people flying on commercial rockets, viz., “Government 
Astronauts.”  This legislation allows highly trained 
astronauts to perform operations not allowed for SFPs.  
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20190025274 2019-08-31T13:42:13+00:00Z
  
 
The NASA Administrator identifies which flight 
occupants are so designated [2]. 
 
Soyuz is a series of spacecraft designed for the Soviet 
space program by the Korolev Design Bureau in the 
1960s that remains in service today.  NASA performed 
a study on safety of flight participants aboard the 
current version of the Soyuz and concluded that multiple 
solutions along an “arc of acceptability” (Fig. 1) have  
proven successful [3]. 
 
3. PARAMETRICALLY PROJECTED SAFETY 
OF SUBORBITAL RLVs 
In 2013, the NASA Flight Opportunities Program 
sponsored research at The Aerospace Corporation to 
develop a model for predicting safety of new rocket-
powered sRLVs.  The approach was to evaluate effects 
of vehicle catastrophic failure on the vehicle provider’s 
business case, focusing on demand vs. supply.  This 
market focus emphasized “probability of failure” as 
opposed to the more conventional reliability modeling 
approach, based on “probability of success.”  The 
primary challenge was the need to bridge performance 
data and cultural differences across several distinct 
areas with scant data: 
 Subsonic, supersonic, and orbital flight 
 Expendable and reusable vehicles, human-rated 
and non-human-rated 
 Old and new technologies 
 Past vs. present concepts of safety (user and 
government culture) 
 Vehicle end use (commercial, recreational, 
government, military) 
 Differences in vehicle test programs (minimal 
versus extensive) 
A parametric approach was employed to make 
predictions of sRLV safety using parametrics.  The 
result was a safety comparison of a specific sRLV 
against other flight vehicle categories and activities.  
The predictions were based upon 2015 flight 
technology, Mach 3.5 maximum speed, professionally 
piloted human-rated systems, FAA controlled 
airspace/flight rules, FAA safety regulations, and flight 
profile and other variables, all programmed into the 
model.  Safety of the examined sRLV was found to 
range across columns C and D in Tab. 1 [4,5].  The 
developed model can be a useful tool for comparing 
candidates to historical systems and constructing a 
business case analysis for newly developed flight 
vehicles [4].  The model responds to changes in 
parameters deemed important to flight safety and is 
calibrated to relevant history. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Arc of Acceptability [3] 
  
 
4. VEHICLE GUIDELINES FOR SAFETY-
CRITICAL AREAS OF sRLVs 
Aerospace was tasked by FAA-AST in 2002-2003 to 
develop minimum vehicle guidelines for safety-critical 
areas of commercial RLVs, necessary to ensure the 
safety of flight crew and passengers.  These guidelines 
were developed by reviewing and analyzing 
specifications, requirements, and lessons-learned for 
safety of commercial, military, and experimental 
aircraft, military space systems, and past and present 
human-carrying space systems, followed by 
interpolation and projection of these requirements for 
crew and passengers aboard both suborbital and orbital 
categories of future commercial RLVs.  A bottoms-up 
approach was used to evaluate the following 
subsystems: environmental control and life support 
system; main propulsion system; guidance, navigation, 
and control system; avionics and software; main 
structural system; thermal protection system; thermal 
control system; health monitoring system; electrical 
power system; mechanical systems; flight safety system; 
and crew system [6]. 
 
5. SPACE WEATHER BIOLOGICAL AND 
SYSTEM EFFECTS FOR SUBORBITAL 
FLIGHTS 
Aerospace and the ANSER Corporation were tasked by 
FAA-AST in 2008 to evaluate effects of space weather, 
including solar particle events (SPEs), on human 
biology and electrical systems in RLVs operating at 
suborbital altitudes from launch sites located in low 
(equatorial regions), middle, and high latitudes.  The 
objectives were to (1) identify and describe typical dose 
rates and expected radiation hazards to crew and 
electronics on suborbital flights, including effects of 
solar cycle and extreme solar and geomagnetic events, 
and (2) based on the hazards identified, determine 
mitigation measures and safe phenomena threshold 
levels and then determine recommended flight rules to 
minimize space weather hazards based on results of the 
mitigation methods.  There were two principal 
conclusions.  First, owing to the short duration of flights 
(~30 min. or less) and the even shorter exposure at 
altitudes where atmospheric shielding is significantly 
reduced (~5 min.), the exposure of crew and passengers 
is minimal, except under circumstances where SPEs 
occur, which is less than about 5% of the time.  Under 
typical conditions, the radiation exposure to crew and 
passengers on a suborbital flight is less than that for a 
long duration airline flight.  Secondly, avoiding 
exposure to potentially harmful radiation associated 
with solar or geophysical disturbances can be achieved 
by locating launch sites at middle latitudes, or lower, or 
by delaying flights when there are indications that an 
SPE is in progress or imminent.  For a high-latitude site, 
a possible launch commit criterion could be based on 
event probability distributions [7] 
 
6. CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED SFP 
INFORMED CONSENT 
U.S. Legislation (Commercial Space Launch 
Amendments Act, 2004, and U.S. Commercial Space 
Launch Competitiveness Act, 2015) gives FAA-AST 
authority to regulate commercial spaceflight but does 
not allow the FAA to regulate the safety of people 
aboard space vehicles.  Instead, the law requires 
informed consent of onboard crew and passengers.  The 
occupants must state in writing that they (1) understand 
that the U.S. Government has not certified the space 
launch or reentry vehicle as safe and (2) have been 
informed of the risks of the vehicle they are boarding 
and others like it [8].  Note that waiver of liability and 
informed consent are two different things.  For example, 
NASA does not allow their civil servants to grant 
liability waivers on commercial sRLVs in the 
performance of their official duties. 
Table 1. Probability of Catastrophic Failure or Fatalities for Flight Vehicles and from Other Activities [4,5] 
A: Expected 
(Pr > 10-1) 
B: Probable 
(10-1 ≥ Pr > 10-2) 
C: Likely 
(10-2 ≥ Pr > 10-3) 
D: Unlikely 
(10-3 ≥ Pr > 10-6) 
E: Improbable 
(Pr ≥ 10-6) 
 New ELVs (first 10 
launches) 
 U.S. Civil War 
(Union) 
 WWII U-Boat 
 High-Altitude 
Mountaineering 
 Orbital Launch 
(All vehicles) 
 STS 
 XB-70 
 Normandy (D-
Day) 
 Grand Prix Racing 
 Base Jumping 
 X-15 
 Hang Gliding 
 Motorbike 
Racing 
 Concorde 
 Automobiles 
 Skydiving 
 Bungee Jumping 
 Swimming 
 Fire 
 General Aviation 
 Skiing 
 Lightning Strike 
                                                                                                                       
 
  
 
7. U.S. HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT SAFETY 
RECORD 
The FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation 
has compiled a comprehensive summary of the U.S. 
human spaceflight safety record and posted it on their 
website [9].  The purpose is to provide data to facilitate 
the ability of SFPs to make informed consent decisions.  
This safety record is shown in Tab. 2 and 3. 
 
8. RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR HUMAN 
SPACE FLIGHT OCCUPANT SAFETY 
FAA-AST has developed and published recommended 
practices for human spaceflight occupant safety and 
training, to serve as guidelines for developers during the 
statutory-mandated learning period.  This document, 
“Recommended Practices for Human Space Flight 
Occupant Safety” [10], is intended to be translated into 
a regulatory safety certification regime after the learning 
period expires.  To develop this document, FAA-AST 
worked closely with NASA, industry, and other key 
stakeholders.  The document was the culmination of a 3-
year effort, which involved researching existing human 
spaceflight standards, conducting a series of public 
teleconferences to gather recommendations, and 
soliciting feedback from the Commercial Space 
Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC).  
FAA chose to primarily use NASA’s requirements and 
guidance for the Commercial Crew Program (1100 
Series) as a guide.  The purpose was not to copy 
NASA’s requirements, but to use them to capture 
relevant safety concepts.   
 
The FAA document addresses occupant safety only.  
Public safety and mission assurance are not directly 
addressed.  Both orbital and suborbital flights are 
covered.  Orbital vehicles are defined as those that stay 
on orbit for 2 weeks maximum and can return to earth in 
under 24 hours if necessary.  Orbital rendezvous and 
docking, long duration flights, extravehicular activity, 
and flights beyond earth orbit are not explicitly covered.  
The period of coverage is from when occupants are first 
exposed to vehicle hazards prior to flight through when 
they are no longer exposed to vehicle hazards after 
landing. 
 
The document covers recommended practices in three 
categories, (1) Design (human needs and 
accommodations, human protection, flightworthiness, 
human/vehicle integration, system safety, and design 
documentation), (2) Manufacturing, and (3) Operations 
(management, system safety, planning, procedures & 
rules, medical considerations, and training).  No specific 
level of safety (risk) is defined due to the expected wide 
variety of systems and flight profiles.  Two levels of 
care are articulated: (1) occupants should not experience 
an environment during flight that would cause death or 
severe injury (a low bar), and (2) the level of care for 
the flight crew when performing safety critical 
operations is increased to a level necessary to perform 
those operations.  In an emergency the same level of 
care is not expected to be maintained – only a 
reasonable chance of survival is mandated.  Key 
assumptions were: (1) Each flight crew member is 
safety-critical, (2) SFPs may be called upon to perform 
limited safety-critical tasks, and (3) Clean sheet 
philosophy – no other regulations act to protect 
occupants from harm.  There are several notable 
omissions:  First, although medical consultation is 
recommended, SFPs are free to assess their individual 
risk.  Secondly, long-term health issues from ionizing 
radiation are not addressed.  Third, integration of 
occupant and public safety is an area for future FAA-
AST work. 
 
9. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF SPACE SAFETY 
(IAASS) GUIDELINES 
The IAASS is establishing a commercial Space Safety 
Institute to offer safety certification services on a 
commercial basis.  Guidelines are being developed by 
IAASS using the experience accumulated in more than 
60 years of government space programs.  These 
requirements are intended to protect the flight personnel 
(i.e., crew and SFPs), the vehicle and relevant launcher 
or carrier, and any other interfacing system from 
spaceflight hazards. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 2. U.S. Human Spaceflight Safety Record [9]
                                                                     
 
Table 3. Footnotes from Table 2 [9]
 
10. MEDICAL ASSESSMENT OF HUMANS FOR 
FLIGHT                                                                                                                                              
For NASA operations, medical assessment of aviation 
pilots and space astronauts is performed to ensure they 
are medically qualified for flight duties [11].  The 
medical examiner acts on behalf of the regulatory 
agency to help ensure safety of flight.  The examination 
is performed to meet specific requirements and or 
concerns that must be satisfactorily addressed before a 
safe flight can be implemented.  The 1% rule denies 
issuing a medical certificate to an airline pilot if their 
risk of a medical incapacitation (e.g., heart attack, 
convulsion, stroke, fainting, etc.) is determined to be 
greater than 1% per annum.  Also, medical surveillance 
is maintained. 
 
A report by the FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute 
(CAMI) provides general guidance for operators of 
manned commercial aerospace flights (suborbital and 
orbital) in the medical assessment of prospective 
  
 
passengers [12].  Two categories of passengers are 
discussed, (1) passengers participating in suborbital 
aerospace flights (or exposed to G-load of up to +3Gz 
during any phase of the flight), and (2) passengers 
participating in orbital aerospace flights (or exposed to  
G-load exceeding +3Gz during any phase of the flight).  
The report discusses acceleration risks associated with 
the neurological, cardiovascular, and musculoskeletal 
systems as well as medical conditions that may contra-
indicate passenger participation in suborbital or orbital 
flights and disposition of prospective passengers with 
these conditions.  The report’s medical considerations 
were considered in FAA-AST’s “Recommended 
Practices for Human Space Flight Occupant Safety,” 
discussed above. 
 
The Commercial Spaceflight Working Group of the 
Aerospace Medical Association has proposed 
recommendations for operationally critical flight 
crewmembers participating in suborbital spaceflight 
[13].  The recommendations are: 
 An FAA first-class medical certificate using 
same age-based schedule as for Airline 
Transport Pilot (ATP) pilots 
 Pre-flight medical evaluation 
 Post-flight medical debrief with data collection 
 An independent data repository of medical 
findings 
 Periodic reevaluation of the current medical 
standards during the early stages of 
developmental flights 
 Passive ionizing radiation dosimeters worn by 
each flight crewmember 
 Auditory protection in the helmet or headset 
for all crewmembers 
 Emergency egress training for all 
crewmembers 
 Physiologic training (altitude chamber) to 
ensure flight crew recognition of signs and 
symptoms associated with decompression, 
including hypoxic changes 
 Recent centrifuge or other G training 
 Anti-G suit use on flights until more 
experience has been obtained 
 Parabolic flight training 
 Pressure suit use for commercial spaceflight 
operators 
 Further investigation on effects on pilot 
performance from rapid changes in the 
acceleration/microgravity/entry deceleration 
flight profile 
 
11. SPACEFLIGHT PARTICIPANT TRAINING 
Three SFP training centers have been approved by 
FAA-AST: 
 National AeroSpace Training and Research 
(NASTAR) Center, Southampton, PA 
o http://www.nastarcenter.com/aerospac
e-training/space/passengers 
o FAA Safety Approval No’s. SA 10-
001, SA 12-004 
 Black Sky Training, Colorado City, TX 
o https://www.blacksky.aero/index.shtm
l?trainingsf 
o FAA Safety Approval No’s. SA 13-
005A, SA 14-006 
 Waypoint 2 Space, Houston, TX 
o https://www.waypoint2space.com/ 
o FAA Safety Approval No. SA 14-007 
 
NASTAR offers Basic Suborbital Space Training, a 2-
day program designed to provide future space travelers 
with the core knowledge and skills to become a safe, 
confident, and capable suborbital SFP.  The program 
addresses: 
 Aerospace Environment 
 Space Vehicles & Flight 
 Motion Environment & Orientation 
 Acceleration Forces 
 Life Support Systems and Suits 
 Space Experience 
 Physiological and Psychological Effects 
 G Protection, Countermeasures & Skills 
 Space Safety and Emergency Procedures 
 Maximizing Spaceflight Experience 
 Keeping and Preserving Space Memories 
 G-Tolerance Flights and Simulated Space 
Flights 
 
NASTAR also offers Advanced Space Training, a 2-day 
program designed to provide enhanced knowledge and 
in-depth training including emergency preparedness that 
goes above and beyond the basic space training course.  
The program addresses: 
 Altitude Physiology 
 Spatial Disorientation 
 Situational Awareness 
 Emergency/Rapid Decompression 
 Emergency Procedures & Operations 
 Personal Safety & Health 
 Aerospace Medicine 
 Loss of Control In-flight (LOC-I) Preparation 
& Flights 
 Situational Awareness and Spatial 
Disorientation Preparation & Flights 
 Altitude Chamber Preparation & Flight 
 
Finally, NASTAR offers Space Payload Specialist 
training and Space Suits and Systems Training.  Their 
equipment includes a Phoenix centrifuge (3 fully 
controllable axes with continuous 360° pitch and roll, 
  
 
and real-world displays and controls), an altitude 
chamber that provides a safe, controlled and medically 
monitored setting to conduct high altitude research or 
training, and a Gyrolab GL-2000 that provides uniquely 
controlled, sustained G-force with its planetary axis, and 
360° rotation in 3 axes. 
[http://www.nastarcenter.com/aerospace-
training/space/passengers] 
 
For Black Sky Training, the FAA-AST website lists two 
active safety approvals: (1) Crew & Spaceflight 
Participant Training, and (2) Scenario Based Physiology 
Training. 
[https://www.blacksky.aero/index.shtml?trainingsf] 
 
Waypoint 2 Space offers three levels of spaceflight 
training.  Level 1 is a one-week, fully immersive 
training program designed for anyone interested in 
spaceflight to experience training.  The program 
includes launch and reentry g-forces, microgravity, 
mission control operations, crew resource management, 
astronaut suit fit and pressurization checks, exploration 
of foreign surfaces, extravehicular activity (EVA) 
training using gravity offset equipment and a neutral 
buoyancy environment, normobaric chamber, orbital 
mechanics and flight dynamics, spacecraft docking 
maneuvers, Lunar/Mars terrain negotiation using rover 
exploration vehicles, and virtual reality space 
simulations. 
 
Waypoint 2 Space’s Level 2 training participants spend 
three days in rigorous suborbital space environment 
training designed for a specific flight profile and 
vehicle. Each participant learns and experiences how 
limited exposure to weightlessness and G-forces 
associated with rocket powered flight affect the body.  
The training prepares the participant to take full 
advantage of 5 to 7 minutes of weightlessness during 
their flight.  Participants learn normal and safety 
procedures in preparing for emergency situations in 
dynamic spacecraft simulations including hypoxia 
recovery, smoke and fumes emergency procedures, and 
work as a crew through situational awareness training. 
 
Waypoint 2 Space’s Level 3 Orbital Training Program is 
scheduled to begin in 2020 and is intended to consist of 
eight weeks of rigorous training for the orbital space 
environment.  The program expands to twelve weeks 
with EVA training.  Participants will experience a 
multitude of test scenarios that include aspects such as 
spatial disorientation, emergency depressurization 
procedures, vehicle malfunctions, and contingency 
operations.  Trainees will experience relevant human 
factors, psychological and physical, that must be 
mastered before prolonged spaceflight.  The program is 
designed to increase situational awareness preparing 
participants to live and operate in space.  
[https://www.waypoint2space.com/] 
 
12. ASTM-INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE F47 
ON COMMERCIAL SPACEFLIGHT 
In 2016 ASTM International (formerly American 
Society for Testing and Materials) formed Committee 
F47 on Commercial Spaceflight to address privatization 
and commercialization of spaceflight 
[https://www.astm.org/COMMITTEE/F47.htm].  
Industry is utilizing ASTM’s neutral forum to develop 
safety and quality standards and recommended practices 
to facilitate positioning for future regulatory 
requirements as well as innovation in this progressing 
area.  The Committee meets three times annually, with 
about 30 members attending 1 to 2 days of technical 
meetings, in conjunction with industry conferences.   
 
The F47 committee has 9 technical subcommittees that 
develop and maintain these voluntary consensus 
standards.  Two of the subcommittees are addressing 
human spaceflight safety: (1) Subcommittee F47.01, 
Occupant Safety of Suborbital Vehicles, and (2) 
Subcommittee F47.02, Occupant Safety of Orbital 
Vehicles.  Subcommittee F47.01 is developing a new 
guide, “Fault Tolerance for Occupant Safety of 
Suborbital Vehicles.” 
 
13. COMPARISONS WITH ANOTHER 
CHALLENGING ENVIRONMENT: DEEP 
SEA SUBMERSIBLES 
Deep sea submersibles must survive another challenging 
environment for human safety.  Representative active 
submersibles, each owned by a national government, 
include: 
 U.S.: DSV-2 Alvin, to 4,500 m., owned by the 
U.S. Office of Naval Research (ONR), 
operated by Woods Hole Oceanographic 
Institution (WHOI) 
 Australia: Deepsea Challenger (DCV 1), 
carried Titanic director, James Cameron, to 
ocean’s deepest point, Challenger Deep, 
>10,900 m. 
 France: Nautile, to 6,000 m. 
 Japan: Shinkai, to 6,500 m. 
 China: Jiaolong, to 7,500 m. 
Cyclops 2, in development by a U.S. commercial 
company, OceanGate, Inc., is a 5-person submersible 
designed for descent to 5,000 m. 
[http://www.oceangate.com/pdf/oceangate-cyclops-
2.pdf].  
 
Human safety in government submersibles is assured 
via a detailed systems certification approach.  For 
example, safety of Alvin is controlled by a 350-page 
  
 
NAVSEA manual specifying detailed certification 
procedures for materials and components, design 
factors, testing parameters, life support systems, 
airborne contaminants, and much more [14].  As 
discussed earlier, the U.S. government does not yet 
require that type of certification for sRLVs.  FAA-
AST’s role regarding sRLV safety is limited to licensing 
and regulating until a later date when the industry is 
mature. 
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